# GitHub Enterprise Server SAML XML signature wrapping

Source: https://startwithidentity.com/cves/cve-2024-6800/
Last updated: 2026-08-29
License: content by Start with Identity. Cite the source URL.

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## What broke

GitHub Enterprise Server accepted a wrapped [SAML](https://startwithidentity.com/glossary/saml/) signature. An attacker with direct network access to the instance could forge a response and provision a privileged user. August 2024. Same family as [CVE-2024-4985](https://startwithidentity.com/cves/cve-2024-4985/) and the later [CVE-2025-23369](https://startwithidentity.com/cves/cve-2025-23369/) canonicalization bug.

## Why it matters

Three GHES SAML IDs in one year is not bad luck. Encrypted assertions plus XML DSig is a surface GitHub kept getting wrong, which is why they later funded the ruby-saml review that found [CVE-2024-45409](https://startwithidentity.com/cves/cve-2024-45409/)'s descendants.

## What to do

- Take the August 2024 GHES security update with the May and October SAML fixes.
- Inventory every GHES ACS. DR and lab appliances count.
- If you build a custom SAML SP, do not copy GHES's encrypted-assertion path. Read the [SAML 2.0](https://startwithidentity.com/standards/saml-2-0/) pitfalls first.

## After you patch

A SAML bypass means the service provider accepted an assertion it should have rejected, so anyone who exploited it authenticated as a real user and left a normal-looking log line.

- **Revoke every session** issued by the affected service provider, then rotate its session signing keys. Patching stops new forgeries and does nothing about sessions already minted.
- **Audit administrative accounts and group memberships** for changes during the exposure window. Signing in as an administrator is the point of this class, and adding a second account is the standard persistence step.
- **Rotate the identity provider signing certificate** if the flaw involved signature validation, and confirm the service provider pins the expected certificate rather than trusting anything in the assertion.
- **Check your own implementation for the same class**: exact-match comparison on verification results, rejection of unexpected signature algorithms, and audience and recency checks on every assertion. See [SAML 2.0](https://startwithidentity.com/standards/saml-2-0/) and [SAML vs OIDC](https://startwithidentity.com/guides/fundamentals/saml-vs-oidc/).

## Sources

- [NVD: CVE-2024-6800](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-6800)
- GitHub GHES security advisories, August 2024