# GitHub Enterprise Server SAML encrypted-assertion, incomplete fix

Source: https://startwithidentity.com/cves/cve-2024-9487/
Last updated: 2026-08-29
License: content by Start with Identity. Cite the source URL.

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## What broke

CVE-2024-9487 is the incomplete fix of [CVE-2024-4985](https://startwithidentity.com/cves/cve-2024-4985/). GitHub Enterprise Server still accepted a crafted encrypted [SAML](https://startwithidentity.com/glossary/saml/) assertion after the May patch. An attacker could bypass SSO and provision access. GitHub described the October update as further hardening of the encrypted-assertions feature.

## Why it matters

Same class as the ruby-saml incomplete-fix train ([CVE-2025-54572](https://startwithidentity.com/cves/cve-2025-54572/)). "We patched GHES SAML in May" was not a closed ticket. Encrypted assertions stayed the weak mode.

## What to do

- Confirm the October 2024 GHES security release, not only the May one.
- Disable encrypted assertions if you do not need them. Plain signed assertions with a single XML stack fail more obviously.
- Re-hunt site-admin provisioning from May through October 2024.

## After you patch

A SAML bypass means the service provider accepted an assertion it should have rejected, so anyone who exploited it authenticated as a real user and left a normal-looking log line.

- **Revoke every session** issued by the affected service provider, then rotate its session signing keys. Patching stops new forgeries and does nothing about sessions already minted.
- **Audit administrative accounts and group memberships** for changes during the exposure window. Signing in as an administrator is the point of this class, and adding a second account is the standard persistence step.
- **Rotate the identity provider signing certificate** if the flaw involved signature validation, and confirm the service provider pins the expected certificate rather than trusting anything in the assertion.
- **Check your own implementation for the same class**: exact-match comparison on verification results, rejection of unexpected signature algorithms, and audience and recency checks on every assertion. See [SAML 2.0](https://startwithidentity.com/standards/saml-2-0/) and [SAML vs OIDC](https://startwithidentity.com/guides/fundamentals/saml-vs-oidc/).

## Sources

- [NVD: CVE-2024-9487](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-9487)
- ProjectDiscovery, GitHub Enterprise SAML authentication bypass