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A loose PHP comparison let attackers sign in as WordPress admin through SAML

Two unauthenticated bypasses in the miniOrange SAML 2.0 Single Sign On plugin, CVE-2026-61979 and CVE-2026-15981, treat OpenSSL's error return as a valid signature. Both are under active exploitation.

By SWI Community TeamAug 25, 2026Updated Aug 29, 2026

Attackers are exploiting two unauthenticated authentication bypasses in the Xecurify miniOrange SAML 2.0 Single Sign On plugin for WordPress. CVE-2026-61979 (CVSS 8.1) is a signature algorithm confusion; CVE-2026-15981 (CVSS 9.8) accepts malformed signatures. Both trace to mo_saml_validate_signature() performing a loose boolean check on the tri-state integer PHP's openssl_verify() returns, so the error value of -1 is read as success. An attacker crafts a SAML response with a deliberately broken signature, triggers an OpenSSL error, and is signed in as administrator. Fixed in 17.0.5 and 17.0.6. DigitalOcean's security team found them after spotting odd admin sessions from outside its network.

Why it matters

This is the classic SAML failure mode and it keeps recurring because signature validation sits in application code rather than in the protocol. The bug is not cryptographic: OpenSSL did its job and returned an error. The plugin asked "is this truthy" instead of "is this exactly 1," and -1 is truthy. Any implementation that wraps a tri-state C-style return in a boolean check has the same latent flaw. If you maintain a SAML service provider, audit for exact-match comparison on verification results, reject responses with unexpected algorithms rather than falling through, and pin the expected signing certificate. Exploitation so far looks like opportunistic scanning from six IPs with public proof-of-concept code, which means unpatched instances get found quickly. Related: SAML vs OIDC.

Source: The Hacker News

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