Non-human and AI agent identity, by ear

What machine identities are, why they matter in modern IT, and why lifecycle management and regulation shape how they must be managed.

A panel introduction to what non-human identities are, why they are critical, and the main risks and challenges they create.

How machine identities differ from human ones, why legacy practices fail them, and why teams are moving to dynamic, ephemeral machine credentials.

The main ways attackers find and exploit secrets and credentials leaked in source code, and how developers can defend against those attacks.

How service principals, app registrations, and agent identities become hidden admins, which API permissions to hunt for, and why to replace secrets with managed identities.

Why workload identities should be treated as privileged, how long-lived secrets widen the attack surface, and how ephemeral secrets, SPIFFE/SPIRE, and policy-as-code help.

What SPIFFE is, how it places a workload or AI agent identifier inside a certificate, and how policy engines can allow-list those identifiers.

Why non-human identity risk built up while human identity matured, covering service accounts, unrotated API keys, hardcoded credentials, and zero trust for AI agents.

A conference session on the methods attackers use to compromise non-human identities.

Where authentication and authorization standards fall short for non-human identities and AI agents, and which emerging frameworks and external guardrails aim to close the gap.

Identity challenges raised by AI agents, the role of MCP, and recursive delegation and scope attenuation, drawing on the OpenID Foundation agentic AI whitepaper.

Why per-action, real-time authorization fits AI agents, where MCP vendors fall short of their own OAuth spec, and what practical agent rollout guardrails look like.

How existing OAuth specifications such as JWT authorization grant, token exchange, and client ID metadata, plus SPIFFE, apply to securing AI agents as workloads.

Why MCP security is an API, identity, and authorization problem, covering unauthenticated MCP servers, tool poisoning, prompt injection, and practical next steps.

How Entra Agent ID blueprints, agent identities, and agent users relate, and how stolen blueprint credentials could reach agent identities in other tenants.