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Federation Assurance Level (FAL)

NIST 800-63C levels describing how strongly a federated login protects the assertion an identity provider (IdP) sends to a relying party (RP). FAL1: the IdP signs the assertion with approved cryptography and restricts its audience. FAL2: adds strong protection against assertion injection, limits each assertion to a single RP, and requires a trust agreement set up before the transaction. FAL3: the RP also verifies that the subscriber controls an authenticator, through a holder-of-key assertion or a bound authenticator. Defined in NIST SP 800-63C-4.

FAL is the level teams forget to write down. A program can demand AAL3 at the IdP and then hand the result to every application as a bearer SAML assertion or ID token, which an attacker who steals it can replay without ever touching the hardware key. The practical line in Revision 4 sits at FAL2, where injection protection means the RP must start the federation transaction, so unsolicited IdP-initiated responses no longer qualify. FAL3 closes the replay gap the same way proof of possession does for OAuth tokens: the assertion is only useful alongside a phishing-resistant authenticator the user holds.

See also: NIST 800-63, AAL, IAL, identity federation, SAML 2.0

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