Identity Incident Communication Template
Notification checklists and fill-in message templates for a credential or session compromise: the GDPR, NIS2 and SEC clocks from official sources, what each notice must contain, and customer, regulator and internal messages with identity-specific actions.
When an identity incident (stolen credentials, hijacked sessions, a compromised admin or integration token) may have exposed data or disrupted a service, several clocks can start at once: data protection regulators, sector cybersecurity authorities, securities regulators, contracts with customers, and the people whose accounts were affected. This template lists the main clocks with their official sources, a checklist for each notice, and fill-in messages that tell customers what happened and exactly what to do about their sessions and credentials. It is not legal advice: confirm with counsel which regimes apply to you before the incident, and record the answer here.
How to use this template
- Before an incident: fill section 1 (which regimes apply, who decides, who sends) and get legal sign-off. Pre-approve the message skeletons in section 5.
- At detection: open this document alongside the identity incident response runbook. Record the "aware" time in UTC; most clocks run from it.
- During the incident: update the fact sheet (section 3) as facts change. Send notices in phases rather than waiting for a complete picture; GDPR allows information in phases, and NIS2 is built on staged reports.
- After: file the record (section 7) whether or not you notified anyone.
1. Pre-incident decisions
| Question | Answer |
|---|---|
| Are we a controller or processor of personal data of people in the EU/EEA or UK? | [ ] |
| Are we an essential or important entity under NIS2 in any member state? Which national CSIRT or authority? | [ ] |
| Are we a US public company subject to SEC Form 8-K? Who determines materiality? | [ ] |
| Other regimes (DORA, NYDFS Part 500, HIPAA, state breach laws, sector rules) | [ ] |
| Contractual notice commitments to customers (time, content) | [ ] |
| Decision makers: notify / not notify | [Legal, DPO, CISO] |
| Spokesperson and approvers for external messages | [ ] |
| Out-of-band communication channel if email or chat is compromised | [ ] |
Look up regime details on the SWI regulations index and the compliance calendar.
2. Notification clocks (official sources)
| Regime | Who you tell | Deadline | Clock starts | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| GDPR Art. 33(1) | Supervisory authority | Without undue delay and, where feasible, not later than 72 hours; if later, give reasons for the delay | When the controller becomes aware of the personal data breach | Regulation (EU) 2016/679; EDPB Guidelines 9/2022 |
| GDPR Art. 33(2) | Controller (if you are a processor) | Without undue delay | When the processor becomes aware | Same |
| GDPR Art. 34 | Affected individuals | Without undue delay, when the breach is likely to result in a high risk to their rights and freedoms | Same as above | Same |
| NIS2 Art. 23 | National CSIRT or competent authority | Early warning within 24 hours; incident notification within 72 hours; final report no later than one month after that | When the entity becomes aware of a significant incident | Directive (EU) 2022/2555; European Commission NIS2 FAQ |
| SEC Form 8-K Item 1.05 | Investors (public filing) | Generally within four business days of determining the incident is material; materiality must be determined without unreasonable delay after discovery | Materiality determination | SEC final rule fact sheet |
| Contracts | Customers | [per contract] |
[ ] |
[contract ref] |
[Other] |
[ ] |
[ ] |
[ ] |
[ ] |
Notes from the sources:
- GDPR exemptions. Notification to the authority is not required if the breach is unlikely to result in a risk to individuals. Communication to individuals is not required if, under Art. 34(3), the data was protected (for example by state-of-the-art encryption), later measures mean the high risk is no longer likely, or it would involve disproportionate effort (then a public communication is used instead). Every breach must still be documented under Art. 33(5).
- SEC delay. Disclosure may be delayed if the US Attorney General determines that immediate disclosure would pose a substantial risk to national security or public safety and notifies the SEC in writing.
- NIS2 national rules. NIS2 is a directive, so the reporting channel and forms are set by each member state's law. Check the national transposition for your authority.
Guidance: for an identity incident, "aware" usually arrives before you know whether personal data was touched. A session hijack on an admin account with access to customer records is a likely personal data breach until the logs show otherwise. Start the clock and stop it with evidence, not the other way round.
3. Incident fact sheet (keep current)
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Incident ID | [ ] |
| Aware time (UTC) and how | [ ] |
| Type | [credential theft / session or token theft / MFA bypass / admin takeover / integration token compromise / insider] |
| Identities affected | [number and type: workforce, customer, admin, service account, OAuth app] |
| Systems and data reached | [ ] |
| Categories and approximate number of people affected | [ ] |
| Categories and approximate number of records affected | [ ] |
| Entry vector | [phishing / infostealer / help desk / leaked secret / third party] |
| Containment done | [sessions revoked, tokens rotated, accounts disabled, apps removed] with times |
| Likely consequences for individuals | [account takeover, fraud, exposure of ...] |
| Cross-border impact | [ ] |
| Suspected unlawful or malicious | [ ] |
| Third party involved | [provider name, their incident reference] |
4. Regulator notification checklist
GDPR Art. 33(3), minimum content:
- Nature of the breach, including where possible the categories and approximate number of data subjects and of personal data records concerned.
- Name and contact details of the DPO or other contact point.
- Likely consequences of the breach.
- Measures taken or proposed to address the breach, including measures to mitigate its possible adverse effects.
- If notifying after 72 hours: the reasons for the delay.
- If information is incomplete: say so, and say when the next update will follow.
NIS2 (per national form):
- Early warning within 24 hours of becoming aware. The Commission notes it can also be used to ask for guidance or operational advice on mitigation.
- Incident notification within 72 hours of becoming aware, updating the early warning.
- Final report no later than one month later.
- Content for each stage taken from Article 23 of the Directive and your national authority's form:
[link to national form].
SEC Form 8-K Item 1.05:
- Material aspects of the nature, scope and timing of the incident.
- Material impact or reasonably likely material impact, including on financial condition and results of operations.
- Record of when and how materiality was determined.
5. Message templates
5.1 Customer or user notice (credential or session compromise)
Subject: Security notice about your
[Product]accountOn
[date], we found that[an unauthorized party / an attacker using stolen login sessions]accessed[some accounts / your account]on[Product]. We have[ended all active sessions / reset credentials / revoked access tokens]for affected accounts.What happened:
[one or two plain sentences: entry route, time window]What information was involved:
[categories of data, or "we have no evidence that ... was accessed"]What we have done:
[revoked sessions and tokens on date/time; blocked the method used; required re-enrollment of MFA; notified authorities where required]What you should do now:
- Sign in again. You will be asked to
[re-verify / re-enroll MFA].- Review recent activity at
[link]and tell us about anything you do not recognize.- If you reused your
[Product]password elsewhere, change it there.[For admins:]Review users, admin roles, API keys and connected apps added since[date], and rotate any API keys or integration tokens issued from[Product].- Be careful with messages that claim to be from us. We will never ask for your password or MFA code.
For more information:
[status page / FAQ link],[contact].[DPO contact if applicable].
Guidance: GDPR Art. 34 notices must describe the breach in clear and plain language. The EDPB recommends dedicated messages, not notices buried in newsletters, and says a press release or blog post alone is not an effective way to inform individuals.
5.2 Business customer (B2B) admin notice
To: Security and admin contacts at
[Customer]Incident reference:
[ID]| Status:[investigating / contained / resolved]| Next update:[date/time UTC]Summary:
[What happened, when, which of your tenant's identities or data were reached]Indicators:
[IP addresses, user agents, app or token IDs, time window]for your own log searches.Actions we took on your tenant:
[revoked tokens for integration X; rotated keys; disabled support access]Actions we recommend: revoke and reissue
[API keys / OAuth tokens]; review audit logs for[events]between[times]; restrict[integration]to our published IP ranges; confirm no new admins, SSO connections or MFA methods were added.Your regulatory clocks: if you are a controller for affected personal data, your own notification assessment may be required. Our DPA reference:
[ ].
Guidance: in a fan-out breach your customers have their own clocks. Give them indicators and token IDs early so they can scope their own exposure; see the Salesloft Drift incident.
5.3 Internal staff notice
We are responding to a security incident involving
[accounts / sessions]. You may be asked to sign in again or re-register MFA. Do not discuss the incident outside[channel]. The security team will never ask for your password or MFA code by phone or chat. Report suspicious messages to[ ].
5.4 Holding statement (media and public)
On
[date],[Company]identified unauthorized access to[systems]. We took immediate steps to contain it, including[ ], and are investigating with[outside experts]. We are notifying affected[customers / individuals]and relevant authorities as required. We will share updates at[link].
6. Identity-specific actions to include in every notice
- Sessions and refresh tokens revoked (not only passwords reset), with the time.
- MFA methods registered during the incident window removed.
- OAuth grants, API keys and integration tokens rotated, with the IDs customers should look for.
- New admins, SSO or federation connections and mailbox rules checked.
- Help desk and recovery path closed if it was the entry route.
7. Record keeping
| Item | Kept where | Retention |
|---|---|---|
| Fact sheet versions with timestamps | [ ] |
[ ] |
| Notify / not notify decision with reasons, per regime | [ ] |
[ ] |
| Copies of every notice sent, recipients, time sent | [ ] |
[ ] |
| Regulator acknowledgments and reference numbers | [ ] |
[ ] |
| GDPR Art. 33(5) breach register entry: facts, effects, remedial action | [ ] |
[ ] |
Maps to: ISO/IEC 27001:2022 Annex A 5.24 Information security incident management planning and preparation, 5.26 Response to information security incidents, 5.5 Contact with authorities; NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 IR-4 Incident Handling, IR-6 Incident Reporting.
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